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Professor Franck's Lament
By ABRAHAM D. SOFAER*
It is a delight to participate in HICLR's round-table on
preemption.' The review has done a great service by inviting
Professor Tom Franck to address this important issue. As Professor
Franck makes clear in his paper, all states will inevitably cite the
standards and procedures that the United States and its allies assert
for using preemptive force, as justifying their own actions. We must
expect that. It is also clear that grave dangers accompany the
preemptive use of force by states. The institutional danger, so well
articulated by Professor Franck, is that such actions will undermine
the utility and potential of the United Nations Security Council, and
other multilateral bodies, including NATO. The strategic danger is
that the threat of preemption will actually cause greater instability.
The nature of preemption is such that the state you are threatening to
preempt will anticipate that you will attack it before it has actually
formed an intention to attack you. The consequence is that both
states will tend to regard a first strike as the preferable course of
action to waiting for the other to attack at its convenience.
Not only do you have the right subject today, you also have the
right person to lead the discussion. Professor Franck is a giant in the
field of international law, and one of the few intellectually rigorous
scholars in the field. He believes in preserving the Charter and the
Charter's values, not just the claims of international law professors as
to its meaning. He understands that some restrictive views of the
Charter are simply untenable. He understands that new threats exist
to international peace and security that require states to consider
using force in their self-defense, or in the defense of human rights.
* George P. Shultz Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
Professor Sofaer served as Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State from 1985-
1990.
'As used in this article, the word "preemption" is meant to include preventive use
of force, not merely uses of force in the face of imminent attack.
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He understands that we have failed states in this world, that we have
enhanced moral standards in this world, and that there are greater
demands on us as a result to prevent genocides and other massive
violations of human rights. And he understands, finally, that if a
Kosovo, or a Rwanda, presents itself, not only are we justified in
acting to prevent those kinds of humanitarian crises, but that it is
appropriate to treat our intervention in such situations as precedents;
such actions are not simply exceptions to the rules, as most
international lawyers interpreted Kosovo, but rather situations in
which we acted properly in defense of persecuted Muslims and
others, and would do so again if the similarly compelling
2circumstances arose once more.
My differences with Professor Franck begin with the hope that
his reading of the National Security Strategy (NSS) is wrong. I
disagree with him that the most important innovation in the NSS is
that the United States is asserting a right to act unilaterally. As he
ultimately recognizes, the United States has claimed the right to act
without Security Council approval since the Charter was written and
ratified. President Truman would have gone into Korea if the
Security Council had not given him authority to do so, and every
President of the United States since Truman used force without
Security Council approval? Every President has unilaterally used
force, and the U.S. has always retained the right to use force without
Security Council approval.4 That point is not an innovation of the
NSS.
In this regard, it seems fair to point out that not enough credit is
given to the Bush Administration by Professor Franck and others for
its willingness to work with and through the Security Council and
other international bodies. The NSS strongly advocates relying, not
only on force, but on all other means for achieving security, including
diplomacy, economic development, intelligence, and alliances And
2. See Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L.
1, 19 n.86 (2000).
3. See Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and the Use of Force, THE
NATIONAL INTEREST 53, 55-57 (Fall 1998).
4. The NSS states: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary,
to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to
prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country." National
Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
available at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html> (last visited June 16, 2004).
5. The NSS states that the US will work for economic progress, and will
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the Bush Administration has demonstrated its commitment to this
policy through its actions. It has succeeded in bringing Libya to the
table without any use of force; it is negotiating effectively to deal with
the threat of North Korea, with the help of China and other states; it
has contributed to stability between Pakistan and India through the
brilliant diplomatic efforts of Deputy Secretary of State Armitage;
and, it is working with its allies and the relevant agencies to confront
Iran over its nuclear programs. So, a lot of things are being done,
apart from the use of force, to deal with the new elements of weapons
of mass destruction, terrorists, camps, and other similar challenges.
It is also inaccurate to call the Administration's actions
"unilateral"; Afghanistan was approved by the Security Council, and
is a completely multilateral process. In Iraq, we have many allies in
the coalition, and military action came only after some 16 Security
Council Resolutions finding Saddam Hussein a grave threat to peace
and security, as well as to the well being of his own people. Congress
approved the action by large majorities of both Houses, and the law
authorizing the use of force rested expressly on the purpose of
enforcing the United Nations Security Council's Resolutions
concerning Iraq.6
The major innovation in the NSS relates to the other point made
by Professor Franck: the possibility that the Strategy means that, not
only will we use preemptive force in our self-defense, or in the
defense of human rights in egregious cases, but that we will use it to
maintain our hegemony. That truly is a shocking and indefensible
concept. To claim the right to use preemptive force to prevent even a
threat to United States superiority from developing would be an
indefensible policy, not just an indefensible position under the
Charter. I choose to read the NSS differently, however, and the text
lends no support to so reckless a theory.7
The NSS does state that the United States will not let any other
state challenge our superior strength. And, yes, the NSS also says we
promote the use of alliances, and the use of diplomacy, among other things to achieve
its objectives. Id.
6. October 16, 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq,
Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
7. The NSS states: "We must build and maintain our defenses beyond
challenge." But it calls for the use of force only to defeat an adversary "if deterrence
fails." And in discussing preemption, the NSS states: "The purpose of our actions
will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and
friends." National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 4.
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are going to defend ourselves preemptively when we are threatened.
But those two concepts, if they are separate (as they are written), are
both defensible. The notion that the United States wants to stay
strong enough to be beyond the challenge of other states in the world
is one that is, I think, sound. The United States does more to defend
morality and freedom in the world than any other state, and keeping
America strong will serve the interests of the world and the values of
the Charter. The NSS is also defensible in claiming the right to use
preemptive force in the face of real threats.8 So, I am hoping that
Professor Franck's lament is needless, in that the NSS was not meant
to connect the two propositions he cites.
I wish Professor Franck had given you more of a flavor of his
other works and taken you through some of the steps that he has so
ably laid out, that would help create a set of Charter rules that truly
would be viable in the world. I don't agree with him that Article 2(4)
of the Charter is properly read as representing an agreement by all
states to "abjure autonomous recourse to violence," in all situations
that do not fall within the narrowest reading of the self-defense
clause.9 I wish he would reject that view and join me in affirming that
the Charter provisions related to the use of force were essentially
hijacked by international lawyers in the Charter's early days, and that
their positions have made the Charter seem unworkable. The
Charter's language is, in fact, far more flexible than international
lawyers are yet prepared to admit. Article 2(4) does not absolutely
prohibit the use or threat of force; it says that all Members shall
refrain from the threat or use of force "against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Professor
Franck notes the ambiguity of this language in his recent book, but he
refuses to acknowledge that this implies that the Charter does not
absolutely prohibit using force to preserve the territorial integrity or
political independence of a state, or in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
I do not claim, and the United States has never claimed, that a
state can unilaterally decide that it is using force consistent with the
purposes of the United Nations, and therefore that every such use of
8. Abraham D. Sofaer, On The Necessity of Preemption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 211
(2003).
9. Thomas M. Franck, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 21 (2002).
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force is lawful. But the United States has always held that the use of
force in support of freedom, or to prevent genocide or otherwise
protect recognized human rights, is more justifiable than uses of force
that lack such circumstances. But international law is claimed not to
permit taking such factors into consideration. International lawyers
have a cubbyhole approach: one must establish that a use of force
meets the requirements of self-defense or was approved by the
Security Council, or by some other particular rule, or the use of force
is illegal. Under this approach, the fact that international law does
not support a rule allowing uses of force for humanitarian
interventions renders irrelevant the fact that an intervention prevents
a humanitarian disaster. A recent article, for example, argues that
one should judge the propriety of any preemptive use of force in part
by whether it is attempting to change the status quo. ° That is a
consistent position of international lawyers, allegedly because we
cannot legitimately distinguish between right and wrong when it
comes to force; all force is presumptively evil.1 This marginalization
of those values that mean the most to us as human beings is wholly
artificial and gives international law a bad name.
The other Charter provision central to use of force issues, Article
51, is also treated by most international lawyers as unambiguously
limiting uses of force to the defense of state territory from an armed
attack, some claim by the military forces of another state. Yet, the
words of Article 51 are that "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." The
provision is ambiguous at best, and it is questionable to assume that
an "inherent" right that cannot be limited by anything in the Charter
is limited by the very Article in which it is affirmed. Professor Franck
concedes that this provision should not be read narrowly, and that
world leaders need greater flexibility in dealing with the very real
threats they face.12 But he has not yet accepted the logical conclusion:
that uses of force in self-defense must be judged by whether they are
reasonable in the circumstances (including whether they are
necessary and proportionate), not solely by whether they are
10. Thomas Graham, Jr., National Self-Defense, Internationl Law, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Is International Law Relevant to Arms Control? 4 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 1.
11. See the critical evaluation of this idea in Robert H. Bork, The Limits of
International Law, The National Interest, Winter 1989/90, at 3, 10.
12. FRANCK, supra note 9, at 53-108.
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responses to attacks by conventional forces against the territory of a
state.
Despite the fact that Professor Franck fails to join me in rejecting
some untenable claims of international lawyers, he and I end up
agreeing on the most important issues. We look at the actions of the
United Nations and of individual states as precedents, upon which the
United Nations and states can properly thereafter rely, where
evidence of their acceptance exists. We agree that the Charter is a
living constitution. Professor Franck's recent book, Recourse to
Force, explains how the Charter has gradually been read and applied
in creative ways to make the United Nations and the Security Council
more effective. 3  He finds several precedents for using force,
especially collectively, based on prior Security Council and some
unilateral actions. My preference would be to adopt an approach to
the use of force based on the rule of reason, that gives weight to the
factors relied upon and the actions taken by the Security Council,
even if those resolutions don't amount to an explicit grant of power to
use force. 4 If that approach is unsatisfactory, then we should work on
some other approach that has the potential to bring national security
officials and diplomats to the table to argue rationally about the use
of force. The current, artificial rules understandably lack credibility
with national security professionals. Government officials - at their
best - rest their judgments on an overall appraisal of all the factors
relevant to uses of force. Lawyers need to accept that sound reality
and help ensure that all the proper factors are in fact considered, that
traditional protections (such as necessity and proportionality) are
applied, and that the process is as honest and comprehensive as
possible.
Professor Franck is also properly critical of the United States for
failing to use and support the Security Council in Iraq after the initial
stages of the war. I fully supported the war in Iraq, but the
Administration made its task there far more difficult than was
necessary for our defense by the manner in which it conducted its
post-war activities. The Security Council had for some time been
prepared to come in and cooperate with us in a regime change that
would have been far less expensive, far less traumatic. But we
insisted, not only on keeping the lead; we had to be the occupying
power, with all the responsibility and alienation that posture was
13. Id. at 20-44.
14. Sofaer, supra note 2, at 11.
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certain to provoke. President Bush had successfully created an
excellent multilateral model for post-conflict administration in
Afghanistan, and we learned a lot in Kosovo and Serbia. We could
have put all that into practice in Iraq. Trained police forces all over
the world were ready to join in. India at one point was ready to send
many thousands of troops if we were only willing to give up occupying
power status. But a different strategy was adopted, one based on a
greatly exaggerated view of our ability to control events in a hostile
environment.
So, I share Professor Franck's concern about the NSS insofar as
it reflects an attitude among those who wrote it that is overreaching
and unrealistic. The President's policies with regard to uses of force,
both during the campaign and in all areas other than Iraq, called for
humility and realism. 5 Those who shaped the post-invasion policy for
Iraq seriously failed the President, in my view, and adopted ends and
means that do not reflect his sober warnings issued prior to being
elected and thereafter.
The facts that ease my concerns about this over-ambitious
agenda in Iraq are the very substantial costs of the Iraq operation; it
has been so staggering in terms of lives, injuries, dollars and good will,
that we are unlikely for some time at least to replicate this approach
again, anywhere. In fact, it is very much to the President's credit that,
when he became convinced that those planning the reconstruction of
Iraq had made serious miscalculations and could no longer be trusted
to complete the job, he ordered that occupying status end on June 30,
2004. While many complain that this is a politically driven decision, I
celebrate that fact; the President is determined to limit the costs of
Iraq, while ensuring that the fundamental purpose of the operation -
the security of the United States and Iraq's neighbors - is achieved.
In conclusion, and in the spirit of Tom's focus on what can be
done to enhance the future utility of the United Nations, I would
make the following suggestions about what our options are globally to
deal with the problem of the use of force. Tom's excellent new book
on the use of force quotes from Kofi Annan the statement that "the
problem in the world today is as much the failure to use force as it is
the uses of force. ' 6  This is a profound insight and the key to
15. Condoleeza Rice, Remarks by Dr. Condoleeza Rice, available at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626.html> (last visited June 17,
2004).
16. Kofi Annan, Adoption of Policy of Preemption Could Result in Proliferation
of Unilateral, Lawless Use of Force, Secretary General Tells General Assembly,
2004]
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progress. The Security Council has not been effective in dealing with
many situations that require the use of force, or the protection of
international forces. We must make the multilateral use of force,
through the Council, into a workable, viable option in taking on
challenges. Tom's book describes the history of Article 43 of the
Charter.17 This provision was supposed to result in international
commitments from Council members to provide armed forces for
United Nations approved operations. We need this sort of
arrangement, as the Charter intended. If the Council could call upon
multilateral forces ready to deal with situations like Rwanda, or
Liberia, or Haiti, it would be more inclined to act effectively, and
sooner. This change to enhance the capacity of the Security Council
to deal with international crises, could be made without any need to
amend the Charter, and it would lessen the need for actions by states
without Council approval.
In the process of making this change, moreover, the Military
Committee contemplated in Article 43 should be brought to life in a
form and with responsibilities that do not disrupt existing capacities.
The United Nations has developed an effective and experienced
leadership in the area of peacekeeping that should be protected from
unwarranted experimentation. In addition, creating the Committee
could facilitate the enhanced involvement of leading contributors to
international security. United Nations Members that agree to
contribute significant forces to be used to implement decisions of the
Security Council should be added as standing members of the
Military Committee, along with representatives of Permanent
Members of the Council. This change would make available the
opportunity for states such as Argentina, Germany, India, Japan,
South Africa and others to play an ongoing and significant role in
international security through permanent and equal membership in
the Military Committee. The Security Council should agree to
delegate international security issues to the Military Committee for its
consideration and recommendations. Though the veto would remain
in the Council itself, this sort of structural change could significantly
expand the scope of United Nations operations and enhance the
available at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm8891.doc.htm> (last visited June
17, 2004).
17. Article 43 obliges all Members to enter into "special agreements" with the
Security Council to make available "on its call ... armed forces, assistance and
facilities" to carry out mandates related to maintaining international peace and
security. FRANCK, supra note 9, at 22.
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effectiveness of the Council by increasing the roles of many major
states. This is precisely the result that Secretary General Anan and
Professor Franck favor, and the most likely way to convince the
United States and other Members to rely more heavily on multilateral
measures in many more situations than is currently possible.

